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Abstract: Many endorse the Bad-Difference View (BDV) of disability which says that disability 
makes one likely to be worse off even in the absence of discrimination against the disabled or 
‘disablism’. Others defend the Mere-Difference View (MDV) of disability which says that, 
discounting disablism, disability does not make one likely to be worse (or better) off. A common 
motivation for the BDV is the Options Argument which identifies reduction in valuable options as a 
harm of disability. Some reject this argument, arguing that disabled people’s prospects aren’t hindered 
by having fewer options. In this paper, I defend the Options Argument by arguing that, in disability 
cases, having a greater number of valuable options overall improves well-being prospects. As such, 
the Options Argument is sound and – although it doesn’t establish the BDV’s truth – it lends 
plausibility to the BDV by identifying option reduction as a potentially significant cost of disability. 
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Many (e.g. Shakespeare 2013; McMahan 2005; Singer 2005) endorse the Bad-Difference View 
(BDV) of disability which says, roughly, that disability makes one likely to be worse off even in the 
absence of discrimination against the disabled or ‘disablism’. Others (e.g. Amundson 2005; Barnes 
2016) endorse the Mere-Difference View (MDV) of disability which says, roughly, that, in the 
absence of discrimination, disability does not make one likely to be worse (or better) off. A common 
motivation for the BDV is the Options Argument which identifies reduction in valuable options as a 
harm of disability. Some (e.g. Barnes 2009a; Wasserman & Asch 2013) argue instead that disabled 
people’s prospects aren’t hindered by possessing fewer options because the non-instrumental value of 
the options to which disability precludes access is multiply-realisable. Call this the Multiple 
Realisability Reply.  
 In this paper, I defend the Options Argument and reject the Multiple Realisability Reply by 
arguing that, in disability cases, having a greater number of valuable options overall improves well-
being prospects, even though the value of the options that disabled people cannot access is multiply-
realisable. As such, the Options Argument appears to be sound and to support the BDV by identifying 
a potentially significant cost of disability. I don’t argue that the BDV is true. The purpose of my 
arguments is to shift the burden of proof onto those who deny that option reduction hinders disabled 
people’s well-being prospects and, more generally, MDV defenders. Until now, the onus seemed to be 
on BDV proponents to engage with MDV replies to the Options Argument. I do so here, shifting the 
onus back on to MDV advocates either to reject my arguments, or to identify a benefit of disability 
that counterbalances the cost of option reduction. If they cannot, then the Options Argument offers 
good grounds for belief in the BDV. 
In §1, I offer preliminaries. In §2, I present the Options Argument and discuss two MDV 
replies, arguing that the Multiple Realisability Reply is most promising and that this reply is 
inconsistent with another disability-positive argument, leaving MDV proponents with a dilemma. In 
§§3-4, I defend the Options Argument and reject the Multiple Realisability Reply by i) identifying 
benefits of possessing a greater number of options and arguing that these are relevant to disability 
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(§3), and ii) arguing that the costs involved in possessing additional options appear unlikely to offset 
the benefits in disability cases (§4). Finally, in §5, I respond to objections and note residual issues. 
 
1 – PRELIMINARIES  
Whether possessing more options improves prospects is a general issue. One debate in which other 
thinkers have discussed it (e.g. Singer 2001: 56; Moller 2011: 198-99), and to which it appears 
intuitively relevant, is that between the MDV and BDV. In this paper, I contribute to that ongoing 
discussion. I understand the views as:  
BDV: a person is (in virtue of their disability, other things equal and minus the effects of 
disablism) likely to be overall worse off with a disability than they would have been without. 
MDV: a person is (other things equal and minus the effects of disablism) likely to be overall 
neither worse (nor better) off with a disability than they would have been without. 
Barnes (2009a; 2016) offers arguments against probabilistic interpretations (although cf. Campbell & 
Stramondo 2017; Schramme 2013). However, it’s clearly false that being disabled always makes one 
worse off. Someone could benefit from disability (by, for example, avoiding conscription) and could 
do worse because of disability (by, for example, experiencing chronic pain). We thus need weaker, 
probabilistic claims to capture the views.   
 Both views consider well-being in non-disablist worlds. Roughly, these worlds include no 
disability stigma and no policies that unjustly disadvantage disabled people, and all public spaces, 
media etc. would be accessible as far as is possible within budget and technological constraints. More 
specificity requires consideration of what counts as unjust discrimination, which is beyond my scope.1 
However, I needn’t be more specific, as the option reductions I discuss are (fairly) uncontroversially 
not due to disablism.  
                                                          
1 See (Arneson 2006) for an attempt. 
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 I follow the tradition of discounting only disablism and not other harms such as (non-
disablist) failure to accommodate disability because of lack of resources (cf. Barnes 2016; Kahane & 
Savulescu 2009). We discount disablism, first, because everyone agrees that disability tends to reduce 
well-being prospects in disablist worlds and, second, because this debate originated in the claims of 
disabled people that, absent prejudice (but not other harms), disability would not hinder prospects.2  
 These understandings might face issues involving identity. It’s a difficult question whether 
disabilities are identity-determining. If they are, we cannot compare a particular person’s prospects 
with a disability and without (Campbell and Stramondo 2017: 161). I won’t discuss whether 
disabilities are identity-determining. What I’ll say is that ‘a person’ and ‘they’ in the definitions above 
needn’t rigidly designate the same numerically identical person. If disability is identity-determining, 
we may be comparing the prospects of two metaphysically different, but relevantly similar, people – 
each occupying the same person-location in close by non-disablist worlds. And we needn’t think 
numerical identity must be preserved for a comparison between individuals to bear relevance to moral 
considerations (Kahane & Savulescu 2009: 37). As such, I’ll assume that the relevant comparisons are 
possible and at least potentially morally relevant. This move is dialectically warranted, as all who 
understand the views as comparing the well-being prospects of individuals with disabilities and 
without (e.g. Barnes 2016: 86-88) face similar issues and that, as far as I am aware, none respond to 
the Options Argument or defend the MDV by invoking problems of non-identity. 
I understand ‘disability’ as a condition in which a person has atypical bodily or psychological 
features which, in interaction with intrinsic features of the person (e.g. their personality) and features 
of their environment (built, social or attitudinal), cause them limitations (cf. Shakespeare 2013: 74-75; 
World Health Organisation 2001).3 However, it shouldn’t matter whether you endorse this account, as 
I concentrate on paradigm cases. 
                                                          
2 See work on the Social Model (e.g. Oliver 1996; Finkelstein 1981) 
3 For criticism, see Amundson (2000) and Barnes (2016: 13-38).. 
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 My arguments apply to physical and psychological disability. Some (e.g. Barnes 2016; 
Wasserman & Asch 2013) think that psychological disabilities raise quite different issues; for 
example, perhaps it’s unclear how to evaluate the well-being of severely cognitively disabled people. 
If you think that psychological disability should be considered separately, then you may take my 
arguments to apply to only physical disability.    
I understand ‘well-being’ as the non-instrumental prudential value a life has for the person 
whose life it is. I won’t endorse any theory of well-being; my discussion aims to be theory-neutral. To 
do this, I focus on the substantive goods in life (e.g. achievement, personal relationships etc.) – which 
every plausible theory of well-being agrees typically make life better (Kahane & Savulescu 2009: 43) 
– and assume that (other things equal) the more of these substantive goods we get, the better our 
prospects (cf. Stoner 2016; Campbell & Stramondo 2017).4  
I understand S’s prospects for well-being, roughly, as how likely S is to have a given level of 
well-being. I take idealised subjective probability to be the relevant notion (cf. Jackson 1991: 463-65). 
That is, S’s prospects are determined by the prediction a rational agent would make if they considered 
all relevant evidence. 
I focus on the effects on prospects of quantity of valuable options. I won’t discuss the 
potential effects of quantity of bad options, option quality or diversity. All are potentially relevant 
(Schroeder 2018: 16). I narrow my focus, first, because the discussion about quantity of valuable 
options (henceforth, options) is that which motivates the Options Argument and, second, because 
these other issues deserve more attention than I can provide here. 
Finally, well-being and well-being prospects are an established philosophical topic. However, 
questions about the prospects of different groups are in part empirical, and there might be other 
methods of answering them, such as through empirical investigation. I won’t argue that philosophical 
                                                          
4 This is consistent with it being constitutive of some goods (e.g. achievement) that they require overcoming 
obstacles.  
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investigation is the best way of identifying prospects. Nor do I take what I say to be the definitive 
word on the nature of the connection between options and well-being or, of course, on the quality of 
disabled people’s lives. My aim is merely to contribute to an ongoing philosophical debate and 
encourage further discussion of this topic. 
 
2 – OPTIONS AND DISABILITY 
In this section, I explain the relevance of the connection between options and well-being to the debate. 
First, I present the Options Argument. Then, I discuss two MDV replies.  
Intuitively, having options is good. People generally value autonomy and one way we 
exercise autonomy is by making choices.5 Choices are possible only if we have options from which to 
choose (Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser, 1977). Accordingly, we think that it would be terrible 
to have no options, as this would curtail our freedom. If some choice is good, perhaps more is better. 
After all, possessing more options might allow me access to an option that I would benefit more from 
exercising than I would from exercising any in my original set. If not, then perhaps I can simply 
ignore the additional options. This reasoning might lead one to think that possessing more options 
always improves prospects. Nozick (1967: 132) and Rawls (1971: 143) seem to have thought so 
(Dworkin 1988: 64). Rawls reasons that more choice is always preferable because people ‘are not 
compelled to accept more if they do not want to, nor does a person suffer from greater liberty’. 
If having more options is better, this prima facie supports the BDV. On any reasonable 
understanding (including the one above, on which this is trivially true), disabilities involve 
limitations: a blind person cannot become a surgeon; someone with total body paralysis often cannot 
eat solid foods; severely cognitively disabled people sometimes cannot communicate etc. Some (e.g. 
Singer 2001: 56; Kahane & Savulescu 2016: 776) think that option reduction is a harm of disability. 
                                                          
5 I understand choosing between options as ‘when the act of taking (doing) one of them is determined by one’s 
preferences’ (Ullmann-Margalit & Morgenbesser 1977: 757).  
7 
 
Word count: 9899 
They might think, as Rawls seemed to, that having more options is always beneficial. Or they might 
think that disability in particular reduces options in manner that hinders prospects. I’ll focus on this 
second (more charitable) interpretation.  
Here’s the Options Argument: 
1. If something reduces valuable options then, to the extent that it does, it can have both 
negative and positive effects on well-being prospects.  
2. Disability reduces valuable options.  
3. In disability cases, the negative effects of option reduction are greater than the positive 
effects.  
4. Therefore, insofar as it reduces valuable options, disability hinders well-being prospects.   
This argument doesn’t establish the BDV, as it doesn’t show that disability overall hinders prospects. 
What it purports to do is support the BDV by identifying a harm of disability. There need only be a 
weak positive correlation between option quantity and well-being prospects for the Options Argument 
to support the BDV, as this would suggest that one is likely to do worse with a disability.  
 
2.1 – The Multiple Realisability Reply 
(1) is a modest claim that seems difficult to deny. So, those who want to reject (4) can deny either (2) 
or (3). Many (e.g. Campbell & Stramondo 2017: 159-60; Moller 2011: 198-99; Schroeder 2016: 224-
25; Wasserman & Asch 2013: 149-52) deny (3) on the following grounds. Of course, it would be bad 
to be unable to access any of life’s non-instrumental goods, but disabilities typically only foreclose 
certain avenues by which one can access them. On any plausible interpretation, life’s non-
instrumental values are multiply-realisable and, although disabled people cannot realise them in 
certain ways, they can still experience them all. A blind person can get her fill of aesthetic experience 
by listening to Mozart and a paraplegic person can get his fill of play through wheelchair basketball. 
Therefore, although disabled people may have fewer options, they still have a perfectly good option 
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set that allows them access to all life’s non-instrumental goods – which, the reply claims, means that 
their prospects are not affected by option reduction and (3) is false. 
In defence of the MDV, then, thinkers have rejected (3) by advancing the Multiple 
Realisability Reply.6 This denial appeals to the following premise:  
Restricting goods (RG): For a subject S and some multiply-realisable non-instrumental good 
G, restricting S’s options to access G won’t affect S’s prospects for well-being as long as S 
still possesses some/enough option(s) which enable(s) her to access G. 
RG is ambiguous between two interpretations. RG-some claims that restricting S’s options will not 
affect prospects as long as S still has one option that enables access to each good. RG-enough claims 
that restricting S’s options will not affect prospects as long as S still has sufficiently many options to 
access each good. I’ll focus on the weaker (more charitable) interpretation: RG-enough. On RG-
enough, the Multiple Realisability Reply amounts to saying that both disabled and non-disabled 
people have sufficiently many options, so have equal prospects insofar as these are determined by the 
size of their option sets.  
 
2.2 – The DSO-argument and inconsistency 
So, some defend the MDV by endorsing RG. However, arguments that purportedly support the MDV 
deny principles similar to RG. Campbell and Stramondo (2017) and Barnes (2009a; 2009b; 2016) 
argue that disability is good for prospects to the extent that it grants access to options exclusive to 
disabled people:  
The experience of disability… isn’t just one of absence... It’s, rather, one of absence in 
particular areas that creates (in virtue of that very absence) opportunities in other areas—
opportunities not open to the non-disabled. And some disabled people report that the resulting 
                                                          
6 One might instead reject (2). I consider this in §2.4.  
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experiences disability creates mean that, on the whole, disability is of great benefit to them. 
(Barnes 2009b: 15 original emphasis) 
Examples of disability-specific options include things like access to the disabled community (Barnes 
2016: 116), being able to work peacefully in loud environments (Schroeder 2018: 15) and being 
permitted to avoid long queues (Campbell and Stramondo 2017: 158).7  
This disability-positive argument – call it the disability-specific options argument or DSO-
argument, for short – purportedly supports the MDV by identifying a benefit of disability. However, 
the following is a natural extension of RG: 
Expanding goods (EG): For a subject S and some multiply-realisable non-instrumental good 
G, adding to S’s options to access G won’t affect S’s prospects for well-being as long as S 
already possessed some/enough option(s) which enabled her to access G. 
EG follows from RG if there is symmetry between the effects of adding and removing options to 
access non-instrumental goods. It seems clear that there is. If I benefit S by enlarging her option set 
from O to O*, then I disadvantage her by reducing her options from O* to O. Likewise, if going from 
O to O* makes no difference, then going from O* to O won’t either.  
 So, RG and EG have identical truth values. This is a problem for MDV defenders. RG 
provides a response to the Options Argument. However, EG undermines the disability-positive DSO-
argument. According to EG, the possession of disability-specific options won’t improve disabled 
people’s prospects because i) disabled people already have access to all life’s goods prior to the 
addition of disability-specific options, and ii) the value of disability-specific options is multiply-
realisable. This means that non-disabled people can realise the relevant non-instrumental goods 
through alternative means. For instance, the value of accessing the disabled community can 
presumably be realised through accessing other communities. There doesn’t appear to be any non-
instrumental value uniquely experienced by disabled people. Thus, EG implies that possessing 
                                                          
7 See Barnes (2016: 88–95), (2009a: 341–42) and (2009b: 15) for more discussion.  
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disability-specific options wouldn’t improve disabled people’s prospects for the same reason that, 
according to EG, the option of becoming an airline pilot doesn’t improve the prospects of sighted 
people. MDV proponents, therefore, must deny EG for their DSO-argument to run.  
 This leaves MDV proponents with a dilemma. Endorsing RG while denying EG is to be 
inconsistent. They can either reject both, which would deprive them of their reply to the Options 
Argument, or they can endorse both, which would deprive them of their DSO-argument about the 
benefits of disability. Neither option is appealing for the MDV advocate.  
 
2.3 – The sufficiency interpretation 
Perhaps one interpretation exists on which the DSO-argument can be reconciled with the Multiple 
Realisability Reply: the sufficiency interpretation. To explain it, I must introduce some terminology. 
Call the option sets of disabled people without the addition of disability-specific options their basic 
option sets; call their option sets with the addition of disability-specific options their enhanced option 
sets; and call the options unavailable to disabled people non-disability specific options.  
The DSO-argument is straightforwardly inconsistent with RG-some, as EG-some (which has 
the same truth value as RG-some) holds that disability-specific options won’t improve disabled 
people’s prospects because disabled people already have in their basic option sets at least one option 
to access each good. However, EG-enough says that expanding options will improve prospects if the 
size of a person’s option set is not at or above the sufficiency threshold T. So, one can consistently 
hold that disability-specific options improve disabled people’s prospects by enlarging their options 
sets closer to T, while believing that disabled people would not benefit from gaining non-disability 
specific options because the size of disabled people’s enhanced option sets is at or above T, meaning 
that additional (non-disability specific) options have no benefit. On the sufficiency interpretation, 
then, perhaps MDV advocates can keep their DSO-argument about the benefits of disability while 
holding the RG-enough interpretation of the Multiple Realisability Reply. 
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I will now argue that the DSO-argument and the Multiple Realisability Reply are inconsistent 
even on the sufficiency interpretation. If MDV proponents want to reject the Options Argument, as 
they do, it’s crucial that they maintain that disabled people wouldn’t (and non-disabled people don’t) 
benefit from possessing non-disability specific options. For this to be so, the size of disabled people’s 
enhanced option sets must be at T. If not, then possessing more (non-disability specific) options would 
improve disabled people’s prospects. But the view that the size of disabled people’s enhanced option 
sets is at T seems implausible given the significant variation in the sizes of the basic option sets of 
different disabled people and in the amount of disability specific options different disabled people 
possess. Different people with different disabilities in different locations with different incomes etc. 
are going to possess different amounts of options. This implies that, wherever T is placed, there will 
likely be some disabled people who don’t reach it, even with the addition of disability-specific 
options. For these disabled people, non-disability specific options would improve their prospects (on 
the view we are considering), meaning that the Multiple Realisability Reply – which states that non-
disability specific options do not improve prospects – would be unsound. 
Seemingly the only way to keep the Multiple Realisability Reply and make it such that the 
addition of non-disability specific options wouldn’t improve disabled people’s prospects would be to 
stipulate that T is located such that even disabled people with the smallest enhanced option sets reach 
it. There are two problems with this move, however. First, the MDV advocate must motivate this 
placement of T to avoid seeming ad hoc. Second, and more seriously, placing T so low would nullify 
the purported benefits of disability-specific options. Placing T low enough to keep the Multiple 
Realisability Reply on the sufficiency interpretation would imply that the majority of disability-
specific options have no effect on prospects, as it implies that most disabled people’s basic option sets 
would already be at T, meaning that, for them, disability-specific options would have no benefit.  
Now, disability-specific options are presented as being general benefits of disability. That is 
not to say that thinkers appeal to them as evidence that disability is overall good for prospects. What I 
mean is that valuable options exclusive to disabled people are presented as benefitting disabled people 
who possess them. No thinker suggests or implies that disability-specific options benefit only a subset 
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of disabled people who possess them – namely, those disabled people with the fewest options. But the 
sufficiency interpretation implies exactly this, meaning that, on this interpretation, disability-specific 
options are not generally beneficial. In fact, this interpretation implies that disability-specific options 
are typically of no benefit. As such, attempting to reconcile the Multiple Realisability Reply and the 
DSO-argument using the sufficiency interpretation ends up negating virtually all the purported 
benefits of possessing disability-specific options, nullifying the DSO-argument: on this interpretation, 
it ceases to be an argument about the benefits of disability. Therefore, the Multiple Realisability Reply 
and the DSO-argument about the benefits of disability are inconsistent, even on the sufficiency 
interpretation.    
 
2.4 – Denying (2)   
In this section, I briefly consider a different refutation of the Options Argument. Some might have 
thought that the option set available to the disabled person is simply a smaller subset of the option set 
available to the non-disabled person, which can be represented as the following (where 0 represents 
the options available to the disabled person and 1 represents those available to the non-disabled 
person):  
Figure 1 
 
However, disabled people possess disability-specific options, and perhaps there are a similar number 
of disability-specific options as non-disability-specific ones:  
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Figure 2 
 
If this is an accurate representation, then disabled people don’t possess fewer options and (2) is false.  
The proponent of this reply might accept that options are good for prospects, but they argue 
that disability doesn’t reduce options. One significant problem with this reply is that there are good 
reasons for thinking that, although there are some disability-specific options, the options sets of non-
disabled people are (typically, other things equal) larger than the options sets of disabled people. 
There is an important asymmetry between disability-specific options and non-disability-specific 
options: many supposedly disability-specific options are, in fact, possessed by non-disabled people. A 
hearing person can choose to work peacefully in noisy environments by wearing noise-cancelling 
headphones; a non-paraplegic person can play wheelchair-basketball, and so on (Kahane & Savulescu 
2016: 777). In general, non-disabled people can experience many allegedly disability-specific options 
by ‘making themselves disabled’ in the relevant sense for a period, but disabled people cannot do the 
reverse. Now, the claim is not that by wearing headphones the non-disabled person knows what it is 
like to be deaf. The claim is merely that many purportedly disability-specific options are also open to 
non-disabled people.  
Once this asymmetry is highlighted, it seems that there are fewer truly disability-specific 
options than one might have thought. I don’t dispute that there might be some options truly 
unavailable to non-disabled people. But this asymmetry suggests that there are more options to which 
disability precludes access than truly disability-specific options. This asymmetry may sound trivial to 
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some – perhaps even silly – but I don’t think it is. It highlights the crucial point that disability 
typically involves a net-decrease in options and that (2) is true.  
One might object further that the substitute options available to non-disabled people are quite 
different to those available to disabled people, so shouldn’t be classed as the same options. If so, then 
there might be room to reject (2). My response is that being able to work peacefully in noisy 
environments because one is deaf is of course different in some respects to being able to because one 
wears noise-cancelling headphones. But whether we class these as separate options depends upon our 
chosen level of granularity. We don’t want our specification to be too fine-grained, otherwise there 
would be no overlap between people’s option sets. And defenders of RG certainly don’t want too 
much granularity, since their reply to the Options Argument presupposes a coarse-grained account of 
life’s goods (Asch and Wasserman, 2010). However, we also don’t want it to be too coarse-grained, 
such that importantly different options are understood as being the same. So, the question is: are these 
options importantly different? It’s hard to see the important difference between working peacefully in 
loud environments because one is deaf and because one wears noise-cancelling headphones. What 
seems relevant is the ability to work peacefully in loud environments. As such, the onus seems to be 
on those who want to reject (2) to argue both that disability-specific options and the substitute options 
available to non-disabled people shouldn’t be classed as the same options and, further, that disabled 
people have as many options as non-disabled people. 
So, I submit that (2) is true: the set of options available to the non-disabled person is 
(typically, other things equal) larger than that available to the disabled person, even though there exist 
some truly disability-specific options. We can thus think of the options available to members of the 
two groups in (something like) the following way: 
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Figure 3 
 
In sum, rejecting (2) doesn’t seem a plausible response to the Options Argument. As such, the 
Multiple Realisability Reply is the MDV’s best response. But this reply is inconsistent with the 
disability-positive DSO-argument, leaving MDV advocates with a dilemma. They can advance the 
Multiple Realisability Reply and give up their DSO-argument, or they can keep their argument about 
the benefits of disability and lose their reply to the Options Argument. Either way, the MDV is 
weakened. 
 
3 – THE BENEFITS OF MORE OPTIONS APPLIED TO DISABILITY CASES 
So far, I have presented the Options Argument and discussed two MDV replies, arguing that the 
Multiple Realisability Reply is most promising. Here and in §4, I defend the Options Argument and 
reject the Multiple Realisability Reply. In this section, I present three general benefits of possessing 
more options – even when, without these options, one can access all of life’s goods – and argue that 
these are relevant to disability. This suggests that the Multiple Realisability Reply is unsound as non-
disabled people do benefit from having more options.  
 The first benefit of possessing a greater number of options is that, with more options 
available, a person is more likely to possess options which optimally suit their tastes. Of all ways of 
realising a particular good, some will suit an individual’s tastes better than others. Both listening to 
music and playing sport provide me with pleasure, but I prefer music, so listening to music allows me 
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to realise pleasure more effectively. As such, if I don’t have the option of listening to music, this 
hinders my well-being prospects even though I can still realise pleasure by playing sport. 
In general, while reducing options might not prevent one from realising any non-instrumental 
good, it might stop one from achieving as full a realisation of it as easily as one might have with more 
options available. This will occur when the removed options are among those that would have suited a 
subject’s tastes better than those open to her. Now, this wouldn’t happen in every case of option 
reduction, but it’s a distinct possibility, which suggests that, in at least some cases, restricting options 
will hinder prospects by preventing one from being able to achieve as much value in one’s life as 
easily as one could have with more options available, even if one can still access all of life’s non-
instrumental goods.  
Is this benefit relevant to disability? It seems so. Although a blind person might find her 
occupation extremely enjoyable, she might have found more pleasure in being a pilot or a surgeon had 
she not been blind; while the person with a communicative disability might be able to make and 
maintain satisfying friendships without verbal communication, he might have forged more satisfying 
friendships were he able to communicate verbally. In general, we cannot assume that the options a 
person’s disability removes would not suit her tastes better than those she has (Andric & Wundisch 
2015: 15). So, because non-disabled people have more options, they appear more likely to possess 
options that optimally suit their tastes, improving their access to life’s goods and, thus, their 
prospects.8  
The second benefit is that possessing more options makes one more likely to possess options 
well-suited to a variety of contexts. Certain activities are more well-suited to particular situations or 
moods. Suppose that pleasure is non-instrumentally good. Depending on my mood, different activities 
are more effective at achieving pleasure. Sometimes a discussion with friends works well. Other 
times, I feel like being alone, so a conversation with friends is not pleasurable, but I can still access 
pleasure through reading a novel. Both are ways of accessing the same non-instrumental good, but 
                                                          
8 I consider the objection that disabled people’s tastes adapt to suit their capabilities in §5.1. 
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possessing various options benefits me because activity a is more pleasurable at certain times and 
activity b is at others.  
Many cases appear analogous, where two ways of realising the same good are each more 
effective in different contexts. For instance, one aesthetic experience might be more valuable at one 
time than another. Mozart might be more valuable in a given context (or mood) than appreciating a 
Picasso, and vice versa. The point is that there’s variation in what is good for me to what extent. If 
true, this suggests that reducing ways of realising non-instrumental goods hinders well-being 
prospects, even if a person still has access to a given good. If I cannot talk with my friends, sometimes 
this won’t affect me because I can read my novel instead, but there are times when this will decrease 
my well-being (when a conversation would have been most efficient at achieving pleasure).  
This benefit appears relevant to disability. Men with Spinal Cord Injury often have difficulty 
getting and maintaining erections, experiencing orgasms and ejaculating (Ramos & Samso 2004). 
This makes penetrative sex difficult for some and impossible for others, even with treatment. Sex is 
one method of realising pleasure and expressing emotional intimacy – both plausibly non-
instrumental values. But, while some men with Spinal Cord Injury cannot have sex, they can realise 
pleasure through other means, and they can express emotional intimacy through words, cuddles and 
other kinds of sexual activity. However, if they were not disabled, they could express emotional 
intimacy and achieve pleasure in all these ways and through penetrative sex. And it’s reasonable to 
think that there would be contexts or moods where these substitute activities wouldn’t provide as 
much pleasure, or express emotional intimacy as effectively, as sex would have. The key point is that 
one method of realising a particular non-instrumental value cannot replace another in all contexts. 
Thus, it appears better for prospects to have more options to access a given non-instrumental good, 
which non-disabled people do.  
When considering the impact of options on prospects, we must be sensitive to the way options 
combine. The third benefit is that having more options allows for more combinations. Different ways 
of combining options can be prudentially significant. One consideration regarding combinations is 
that certain options enhance others when exercised together. Getting married is nice, but the 
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experience is enhanced if one is surrounded by family and friends. For many, neither of these things 
on their own brings the amount of pleasure that they do combined. Thus, while removing any one 
option would not prevent them from experiencing pleasure, it prevents them from achieving as much 
pleasure as they could have if all the options had been available. This suggests a kind of value holism. 
Even if one has access to options A, B and C, it seems likely that experiencing them separately 
sometimes doesn’t equate to as much value as combining them. It’s reasonable to think that many 
cases are such that options combine to realise goods more effectively than if they were exercised 
separately, such as when a drink enhances the enjoyment of an evening. If this is true, then increasing 
options to access a given good will, in some cases, allow a person to achieve value more effectively 
by combining options in holistically valuable ways.  
This point also appears relevant to disability. Perhaps listening to certain sounds enhances 
certain visual experiences, or vice versa. Evidence shows that changes in lighting and music affect 
how food tastes.9 So, blindness or deafness might preclude one from experiencing certain flavours. 
More generally, disability might prevent one from experiencing holistically valuable combinations.   
Moreover, certain disabilities – while not removing options – might make options difficult or 
impossible to exercise together. For example, a deaf person who relies on lipreading and sign 
language to communicate must choose between communicating with others and anything that requires 
visual attention. Thus, they cannot communicate while (e.g.) working on a computer, watching a 
movie or navigating a busy city, whereas non-disabled people can do these things, potentially 
allowing them to achieve two valuable things simultaneously. The general point is that disability 
might prevent one from experiencing certain enjoyable combinations, either by removing options or 
                                                          
9 See https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/apr/05/music-enhance-enjoyment-wine-food and 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/science-news/10760380/Why-wine-tastes-better-in-the-right-
light.html.  
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by making options impossible to exercise together. This plausibly prevents disabled people from 
experiencing as much value as they would have otherwise, hindering their prospects.10 
Another benefit of possessing more combinations is that this can allow one to schedule 
options in advantageous ways. Suppose that there are only two non-instrumental values: pleasure and 
knowledge. I can get knowledge by studying and pleasure by running, and both options are open to 
me. Merely exercising both options isn’t all that matters; there might be benefits to scheduling them in 
different ways. Perhaps if I run first I feel less motivated to study afterwards, resulting in less 
knowledge. Whereas, if I study first, I will have plenty of motivation for running and will gain 
additional pleasure at anticipating my future pleasure. So, if I have only the option of running first and 
studying later, then my prospects are worse than if I also have the option of studying first and running 
later. The point is that possessing a greater number of combinations might help resolve some of the 
difficulties of scheduling options in the best ways.  
This third consideration about combinations also appears relevant. The effects of many 
disabilities are not constant. These dynamic disabilities might make scheduling activities in the best 
ways problematic. Taking the example of running and studying, suppose that I have Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome which causes me to experience chronic joint pain and extreme tiredness in the evenings. As 
such, I must perform any physically demanding activity in the first hours of the day. In this case, the 
combination of studying first and running later isn’t open to me. If I want to run (which I do), I must 
do so soon after I wake, and I rarely have the energy or inclination to study afterwards. I can study, 
but I am likely to achieve less knowledge than if I studied in the morning. To use another example, 
suppose that I want to care for my family, which involves cooking my children dinner after school, 
helping them with their homework, reading them a story and putting them to bed. This option is 
theoretically open to me, but school finishes at 3pm, by which time my Chronic Fatigue Syndrome 
causes me to be unable to get out of bed. In this case, my disability, in conjunction with other people’s 
schedules, causes me to be unable to exercise the valuable option of caring for my family in the way I 
                                                          
10 Options might also combine to create disvalue. I consider this in §4.  
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want to. These examples illustrate the general point that the option restriction involved in disability 
might prevent one from scheduling (and, more generally, combining) options in the best ways, 
hindering well-being prospects. 
In this section, I have presented various advantages of possessing more options, even when 
one can already access all life’s goods. I have applied these benefits to non-disability, arguing that 
non-disabled people benefit from having more options. Taking these benefits together, it seems that 
possessing more options allows non-disabled people to access a larger degree of life’s substantive 
goods, improving their prospects as compared to non-disabled people, even though disabled people 
can still access all of life’s goods. If true, this shows that the RG-enough interpretation of the Multiple 
Realisability Reply is unsound (and that RG-some itself is false). The reply says that non-disabled 
people don’t benefit from having more options than disabled people as both groups have ‘enough 
options’. That is, a number large enough such that additional options would not improve their 
prospects. But, if my arguments are correct, then disabled people don’t have ‘enough options’ in the 
relevant sense.  
To clarify, rejecting the RG-enough interpretation of the Multiple Realisability Reply doesn’t 
imply that disabled people must have overall bad lives. Clearly, many disabled people live excellent 
lives, even in the presence of disablism. Also note that my argument doesn’t imply that no threshold 
exists whereby additional options above it make no difference to prospects (i.e. that RG-enough itself 
is false). It merely implies that if such a threshold exists, either disabled people are typically below it 
whereas non-disabled people aren’t, or both disabled and non-disabled people are typically below it. 
Either way, non-disabled people would benefit from having more options than disabled people.  
Relatedly, it seems likely that there will be diminishing marginal utility of possessing 
additional options. That is, (other things equal) one is going to benefit more from possessing 
additional options when one had fewer options originally. But this does not undermine my argument; 
I have presented three general benefits of having more options and have offered realistic and 
generalisable examples of how disabled people would (and non-disabled people do) benefit from 
having more options. This indicates that, although diminishing marginal utility of options is likely, the 
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benefit gained by non-disabled people is not negligible. That is, the utility curve does not sufficiently 
flatten out such that disabled people possess enough options to experience all the benefits of 
additional options. In fact, the benefits for non-disabled people seem reasonably significant. But the 
fact that non-disabled people benefit from possessing more options doesn’t yet show that (3) is true, 
or that the Options Argument is sound, as there may be offsetting costs to possessing more options. I 
consider these next.  
 
4 – THE COSTS OF MORE OPTIONS APPLIED TO DISABILITY 
I have argued that non-disabled people benefit from possessing more options than disabled people. 
However, there are sometimes costs involved in possessing additional options (Dworkin, 1988; 
Schwartz, 2016) which might outweigh the benefits. If so, then having more options would not be 
overall good for prospects in disability cases and (3) would be false. In this section, I complete my 
defence of the Options Argument by arguing that the costs don’t seem likely to outweigh the benefits 
in disability cases. I do this by arguing that non-disability cases are disanalogous to various scenarios 
in which having more options hinders prospects. I’ll discuss three situations like this; I don’t claim 
this is an exhaustive taxonomy.  
 The first situation in which having more options is costly is when this causes deliberation 
costs to rise. When presented with options, one must understand their natures to make an informed 
choice. Gaining this information and deliberating about it takes time and effort. In some situations, 
these costs are not outweighed by the marginal utility gained from the additional options. Perhaps one 
example is buying a car. There are so many options and combinations: which brand? Which colour? 
Do I want tinted windows? If so, which level of tint? Plausibly, any marginal utility gained from 
choosing (e.g.) tint level seven as opposed to six is so slight that it doesn’t compensate for the time 
and effort required to make the decision.  
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Another deliberation cost is difficulty; additional options could make deliberation so difficult 
that one spends too much time deliberating or is so torn with indecision that one never makes a choice 
so never experiences the value of any option. Anita Silvers makes this point:  
We know, for instance, that the absence of limitations can also lead to suffering. People often 
are better off focusing on a few fulfilling options than being torn with indecision by many 
glittering ones (2003: 482). 
As such, additional options can be detrimental to prospects if they cause deliberation costs to increase 
too much. 
The second situation in which possessing additional options is costly is when having more 
options causes one to experience more regret. With no choice, there is no possibility for regret at 
options not exercised. However, if offered a choice, I may eventually regret my decision (Schwartz, 
2016). Regret is typically unpleasant. Therefore, I might be better off with fewer options. This will be 
so when the disvalue of regret at options not exercised outweighs the marginal utility gained from 
possessing and exercising additional options.  
 I’ll discuss deliberation costs and proclivity for regret together, as similar remarks apply to 
both. Do the additional options possessed by non-disabled people cause them to systematically 
experience higher deliberation costs, or more regret, than disabled people? It’s hard to see why that 
would be true. Neither proclivity for regret nor the deliberation costs one experiences appear to be 
closely correlated with one’s quantity of options. Option quantity might be one relevant factor, but 
various others influence both these things.11 
Much depends on the nature of the choice. Plausibly, high-stakes choices typically impose 
higher deliberation costs. And it’s also reasonable to think that one is more likely to regret certain 
kinds of choices – perhaps high stakes choices, or other kinds of choice. But it’s unclear that non-
                                                          
11 I discuss whether other factors mitigate the benefits gained from possessing more option in §5.2.  
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disabled people systematically face more high-stakes (or any other relevant kinds of) choices merely 
because of their increased number of options. This would need to be argued for.  
Another relevant factor is the kind of person one is – in particular, one’s deliberative style. 
Schwartz (2016: 79-80) distinguishes between maximisers (those that aim for the best possible choice) 
and satisficers (those that aim for ‘good enough’ choices). He argues that maximisers have a higher 
proclivity for regret (88-90) because they will always wonder whether they made the optimal 
decision, whereas satisficers are typically happy that their decisions are ‘good enough’. A similar 
point seems to apply to deliberation costs. If one is a maximiser (or neurotic, has OCD etc.), then one 
seems more likely to spend excessive time and effort deliberating or to find deliberation excessively 
difficult because one wants to select the best possible option (cf. Ullmann-Margalit & Morgenbesser, 
1977: 780). However, if one is a satisficer (or carefree, nonchalant etc.), then this seems less likely 
(Schwartz 2016: 150). If this is true, then unless there is reason for thinking that disabled people are 
more likely to be satisficers and non-disabled people are more likely to be maximisers, we shouldn’t 
assume that non-disabled people have a higher likelihood of experiencing regret or significant 
deliberation costs merely because they possess more options. We might expect this if disabled people 
had no choice whatsoever. But, crucially, the range of relevant cases does not include people with no 
choice, or god-like individuals with billions of options. The relevant range is between non-disabled 
individuals with many options and disabled people with fewer, but still many, options. Disabled 
people typically have a large number of options – more than enough to experience regret and 
deliberation costs – and whether they experience as much of these things as non-disabled people will 
greatly depend on what kinds of people they are.  
If we assume – as seems reasonable given lack of evidence – that these other relevant factors 
are distributed evenly amongst disabled and non-disabled people, we can still ask whether non-
disabled satisficers (or maximisers) are more likely to experience regret or hefty deliberation costs 
than disabled satisficers (or maximisers). It’s not clear why they would be. Satisficers typically don’t 
experience much regret unless it’s obvious they made a bad decision (Schwartz 2016: 88) and we’re 
not justified in thinking that non-disabled people typically make worse decisions than disabled people. 
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So, we turn to the question of whether non-disabled maximisers are more likely to experience regret 
than disabled maximisers. It seems unlikely that proclivity for regret (even for maximisers) is closely 
correlated with one’s number of options. People (especially if they’re maximisers) often feel regret 
even when they chose between only a few options. In fact, when we experience regret at options not 
exercised, we typically focus on a small number of options. We regret not choosing that job or that 
car. We typically don’t regret not choosing dozens of other options (unless it’s obvious that we made 
a bad decision). We therefore need only a small number of viable options to experience regret, which 
disabled people (maximisers) typically have. So, it seems unlikely that they will experience 
significantly less regret than non-disabled maximisers merely because non-disabled maximisers 
possess more options.   
Similarly, we need only a small number of options to experience high deliberation costs. 
People rarely deliberate about every available option. Out of dozens of options, familiar 
considerations of taste, ease of access, cost etc. often rule out most of them without much 
deliberation. After this initial ‘screening out’ seems to be when the costliest deliberation typically 
takes place. We generally agonise over a small number of options if we agonise at all. If this is true, it 
is unlikely that non-disabled people (maximisers) generally experience significantly more deliberation 
costs than disabled people (maximisers), because both groups typically have more than enough 
options to experience hefty deliberation costs.  
To put the point another way, it’s plausible that there is diminishing marginal disutility of 
additional options when it comes to deliberation costs and proclivity for regret. That is, supposing that 
possessing more options does make one more susceptible to experiencing regret or high deliberation 
costs, it seems that (other things equal) the difference in deliberation costs – or one’s proclivity for 
regret – between having two and three options is going to be greater than that between having 50 and 
51. These costs don’t seem likely to increase uniformly with number of options, but instead at a 
diminishing rate. And because disabled people have a substantial number of options, and need only a 
small number to experience these costs, the difference between the deliberation costs and regret they 
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experience and those experienced by non-disabled people doesn’t seem like it is going to be 
significant enough to outweigh the benefits of additional options outlined in §3.  
In sum, many factors other than number of options influence the deliberation costs one 
experiences and how likely one is to experience regret, including the nature of the decision and the 
kind of person one is. These factors will likely interact with each other – and with one’s number of 
options – in a complex interplay, and there is no evidence that they are distributed such that either 
group is likely to experience significantly more costs. Moreover, if we assume that these other 
relevant factors are evenly distributed amongst disabled and non-disabled people, my suggestion is 
that the disutility curve of these costs flattens out sufficiently such that non-disabled people aren’t 
likely to experience many more negatives than disabled people merely because they possess more 
options. Disabled people typically have enough options to experience these costs, if indeed they are 
the kind of person disposed to experience them, and additional options don’t seem likely to make a 
significant negative difference in the range of relevant cases. This contrasts with the benefits of 
options I discussed in §4. I argued that disabled people would benefit from possessing the additional 
options they would possess if they were non-disabled, even though diminishing marginal utility of 
options is likely: the suggestion is that the utility curve of the benefits is steeper for longer than the 
disutility curve of the costs, such that the benefits non-disabled people gain from having a larger 
number of options are more significant than the costs.  
I am thus arguing that, as it stands, there is no good case to be made that non-disabled people 
typically experience i) more deliberation costs or regret than disabled people, or ii) enough extra 
deliberation costs or regret to counterbalance the benefits of having more options.   
I have discussed two costs involving the mere possession of options. I will now discuss a cost 
involving the value gained from exercising options. I said above that a benefit of possessing more 
options is access to additional valuable combinations. However, valuable options might also combine 
to create disvalue. If non-disabled people are likely to experience more disvalue holism in virtue of 
having more options, then perhaps having more options doesn’t overall improve their prospects.  
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 Suppose, as seems plausible, that additional options typically grant one access to additional 
disvaluable combinations. One might think that, if access to additional valuable combinations 
improves prospects (as I argued), then access to additional disvaluable combinations hinders prospects 
symmetrically. However, I think this is false because of an important asymmetry: people seek out 
value and seek to avoid disvalue. This has two implications.  
First, through various mechanisms – such as education, reflection and reasoning – we often 
seek to learn, and come to know prior to experience, which combinations are disvaluable. We then try 
to avoid these. Thus, while additional disvaluable combinations might be accessible to me because of 
additional options, I am unlikely to experience many of them as I will seek to avoid them.12 This 
contrasts with valuable combinations. I am more likely to experience the valuable combinations open 
to me as I will seek them out.  
Granted, there might be some combinations that I must experience to learn of their disvalue. 
This is where the second implication of the asymmetry becomes relevant. Once I experience a 
combination, I typically know whether it is valuable or disvaluable, and the rational person will 
continue combining valuable combinations and avoid combining disvaluable combinations again. 
Disvaluable combinations are therefore likely to be experienced only once, or far fewer times than 
valuable combinations. The upshot of this is that the net effect of having more (valuable and 
disvaluable) combinations is likely to be positive. A rational person will seek out and repeatedly 
experience valuable combinations but seek to avoid and rarely return to disvaluable ones. As such, 
non-disabled people seem to benefit overall from having more combinations available. 
In this section, I argued that non-disability cases are disanalogous to three situations in which 
having more options hinders well-being prospects. Together with my arguments in §3, this leads me 
to conclude that (3) seems true: the net effect of option reduction in disability cases seems to be 
negative. I have motivated this by arguing that non-disabled people gain greater access to life’s goods 
                                                          
12 There might be costs to discovering which combinations are disvaluable. However, these seem unlikely to 
outweigh the benefits.  
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in virtue of having more options than disabled people (§3) but don’t seem likely to experience 
offsetting costs due to their additional options (§4). I haven’t established anything about the size of 
the difference in prospects between the groups, nor have I offered completely conclusive arguments 
that the negatives of option reduction must be greater than the positives. The subject matter of this 
debate – that is, the well-being prospects of counterfactual individuals – makes that almost 
impossible. What I’ve argued is that the Options Argument appears to be sound and to identify one 
potentially weighty cost of disability. My primary aim is to shift the burden of proof onto those (e.g. 
Moller 2011; Schroeder 2016; Wasserman & Asch 2013) who deny that the option reduction involved 
in disability hinders prospects and, more broadly, MDV proponents (e.g. Barnes 2016; Amundson 
2005). Until now, the onus seemed to be on BDV proponents to engage with MDV replies to the 
Options Argument, particularly the Multiple Realisability Reply. I have done that here. Given my 
arguments, the onus is back on MDV proponents either to reject them or to identify something good 
about disability that counterbalances the negative effects of option reduction.  
Now, this may be possible, given the scope of my argument. I only considered the effects of 
valuable option quantity, but many other things might be relevant to the prospects of each group, such 
as option quality and diversity, as well as other non-option-related things. I have tried to isolate the 
effects of one factor, insofar as that is possible. And it’s possible that consideration of other factors 
might imply that disabled people’s prospects are not overall worse, especially given that disabilities 
are ‘high-impact traits’ that tend to have a substantial impact on how one’s life unfolds (Campbell and 
Stramondo 2017: 165).  
Defending the Options Argument supports the BDV but doesn’t establish its truth. To do that, 
one must identify all costs and benefits of disability. However, if MDV proponents cannot reject my 
arguments or identify a counterbalancing benefit of disability, then the Options Argument gives good 
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grounds for belief in the BDV.  My argument shows that, as it stands, the Options Argument provides 
a defeasible argument for the BDV.13  
 
5 – OBJECTIONS, REPLIES AND RESIDUAL ISSUES 
In this section, I respond to two objections and note residual issues.  
 
5.1 – Adaptive preference 
Recall, I said that because non-disabled people have more options, they are more likely than disabled 
people to possess options which optimally suit their tastes. One might object by, quite rightly, 
pointing out that people’s preferences tend to adapt depending on their circumstances and capabilities. 
So-called ‘adaptive preference’ might mean that (e.g.) blind people rarely prefer things that require 
sight. Perhaps, then, the options that optimally suit a disabled person’s tastes are likely to be those that 
they possess. If so, then disabled people are just as likely as non-disabled people to have access to 
options that optimally suit their tastes.  
 It’s true that disabled people are among those affected by adaptive preference – almost 
everyone somewhat adapts their preferences to their capabilities, which is likely best explained by the 
human ability to respond to environmental change (Mitchell, 2018).14 But absolute preference 
adaptation isn’t ubiquitous. That is, disabled people at least sometimes prefer things that their 
disability makes difficult or impossible. For example, people with Ocular Albinism (a visual disability 
                                                          
13 It is perhaps also worth mentioning that my arguments in §§3-4 are in principle relevant to other debates 
concerning the relationship between well-being prospects and number of valuable options, such as whether it is 
better to have a female body capable of gestating and giving birth. However, I think that these debates require 
separate discussions as it’s likely that they differ from disability cases in some important respects 
14 I do not understand adaptive preferences as anything irrational or sub-optimal. It is controversial whether they 
are (Barnes 2009b).  
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causing one to ‘see the world [as though] through a cloudy plastic bag’) sometimes desire to create 
visual art, which is made more difficult by their condition.15 Upon reflection, we know, further, that 
disabled people sometimes desire to do things their disability makes impossible (especially if they 
acquire disability). We know that some quadriplegic people desire to navigate the world unaided, that 
some people with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome desire to be more active than their condition allows, that 
some blind people desire to see the faces of their children, and so on. This is all to say that, although 
disabled people’s preferences do adapt, adaptive preference doesn’t undermine the first benefit 
mentioned in §3 as preferences don’t always adapt absolutely; disabled people don’t only prefer 
things that they can do.    
 
5.2 – Other relevant factors 
In §4, I considered whether other factors (such as the nature of the choices one faces and the kind of 
person one is) affect the disvalue experienced because of possessing more options, arguing that there 
was no good reason to think these factors are weighted in such a way to have a systematic and 
disproportionate effect on the disvalue experienced by members of each group. However, I did not 
consider other factors in §3, and it’s possible that other factors influence the value gained from 
possessing additional options in a way such that non-disabled people do not benefit from this. 
First, note that when I considered other factors in §4, I was considering the disvalue of merely 
possessing options. But my discussion in §3 concerned the value of exercising options, and it is less 
clear to me how, and which, other factors might influence this. However, my response is similar to my 
argument in §4: it’s likely that other factors will affect the value gained from exercising options. 
These factors might include a person’s tastes, which options their disability removes and gives access 
to, which options they have access to for other reasons, how many options they exercise, their 
                                                          
15 See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/41XqVthPZMm1lJyswh5zJzN/meet-the-2018-contestants. 
Also note that I am not claiming that possessing this preference necessarily reduces the well-being of people 
with Ocular Albinism.  
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decision-making capabilities and more. But there appears to be no compelling reason to think that 
these factors are distributed amongst disabled and non-disabled people in such a way as to mitigate 
the benefits of possessing more options outlined in §3. This would need to be argued for and I leave it 
open to MDV proponents to do so.  
I cannot make a convincing case about the effects of all possible relevant factors. My 
argument is not bulletproof; but that was not my aim. My aim was to engage with the Options 
Argument and the Multiple Realisability Reply and to encourage more discussion on this topic. If 
MDV advocates point out factors that I have not considered which mitigate the benefits I mention in 
§3, then I have succeeded in my goal.    
  
5.3 – Residual difficulties 
Finally, I’ll briefly note three residual issues.  
 First, I discussed various situations in which having more options is worse for prospects and 
argued that non-disability cases are disanalogous; however, I didn’t present an exhaustive list. This 
leaves the possibility open that there are situations I didn’t consider which are analogous to non-
disability and imply that the option reduction involved in disability isn’t correlated with worse 
prospects for well-being.  
 Second, it’s possible that how a person thinks of themselves impacts the value they gain from 
possessing options or, more generally, the value their life has for them. And disability is something 
that often enters into someone’s self-conception; perhaps, then, conceiving of oneself as a ‘disabled 
person’ or a ‘deaf person’ in some way influences how the possession of options affects prospects. 
This is a potential complication not accounted for in my discussion.   
Finally, although my argument is neutral between the three major philosophical theories of 
well-being (hedonism, desire satisfactionism and objective list theories), there may be other theories 
on which it doesn’t run. Elster (2000) argues that working within constraints can add to the aesthetic 
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value of creative projects. Someone might hold similar views about well-being: perhaps well-being 
consists in living a life as creatively as possible or with the most aesthetic value. On these accounts, 
having fewer options might correlate with better prospects.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I defended the Options Argument and rejected the Multiple Realisability Reply by 
arguing that in disability cases possessing a larger quantity of valuable options overall improves 
prospects for well-being. As such, the Options Argument appears to be sound and provides a 
defeasible argument for the BDV by identifying a potentially significant cost of disability. This shifts 
the burden of proof onto those who reject the Options Argument and, more generally, MDV 
proponents. They must reject my arguments here or identify something good about disability that 
counterbalances the negative effects of option reduction. If they cannot, then the Options Argument 
offers good grounds for belief in the BDV.16 
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